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TAX COMMENT
in the Schlesinger case, "the classification of gifts was deemed to be
arbitrary under the Fourteenth Amendment ** * Here we are con-
cerned only with the Fifth Amendment." 35
The true basis for the minority opinion, however, was "the
difficulty of searching the motives and purposes of one who is dead,
the proofs of which, so far as they survive, are in the control of his
personal representative * * *," " and the tremendous loss in revenue
because of this difficulty, for which Justice Stone elaborately and
profusely gives statistics.
3 7
It is respectfully submitted that the majority opinion is correct
in its position that a death transfer tax was intended by section
302 (c) and it was therefore unconstitutional, but that the minority
is on entirely sound ground in its declaration that a tax on pure gifts
inter vivos, if enacted to remedy a serious situation, would be entirely
valid. The true solution to the problem is more likely to be in, a
revision of section 302 (c), clearly expressing that a tax on pure
gifts inter vivos is intended, rather than in a return to its forerunners,
in view of the proven inutility of the latter.38
THEODORE S. WECKER.
STATE TAXATION OF FEDERAL INSTRUMENTALITIES-FEDERAL
TAXATION OF STATE INSTRUMENTALITIES.-In McCulloch v. Mary-
land, the Supreme Court declared that the constitutionally granted
powers of the federal government were not subject to regulation or
control by the states through the exercise of their taxing powers.1
v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123 (1928) ; Chase National
Bank v. U. S., 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126 (1928) ; see Taft v. Bowers, 278
U. S. 470, 49 Sup. Ct. 199 (1928).
It is submitted that a ruling of the Supreme Court in the future to the
effect that a tax is invalid if intended to embrace gifts inter vivos would involve
overruling the above cases.
' Supra note 6, 52 Sup. Ct. at 365.
' Ibid. 52 Sup. Ct. at 367.
' Ibid. 52 Sup. Ct. at 367, 368.
"Supra note 4. Section 302 (c) has been amended by the REv. ACT OF
1932, tit. VI, §803. In part, this section reads as follows:
"Sec. 803 (a) (Section 302 (c) * * * is amended to read as follows:-
"I(c) * * * any transfer of a material part of his property in the
nature of a final disposition or distribution thereof, made by the decedent
within two years prior to his death without such consideration, shall,
unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in contem-
plation of death * * *.' " (Italics ours.)
'17 U. S. 316 (1819). See also Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 22 U. S. 738
(1824); Weston v. Charleston, 27 U. S. 449 (1829); Dennis v. First National
Bank of Great Falls, 55 Mont. 448, 178 Pac. 580 (1919); Chase National Bank
of New York v. Spokane County, 125 Wash. 1, 215 Pac. 374 (1923). See also
Powell, Indirect Encroachmnent on Federal Authority by the Taxing Power of
the States (1919) 31 CoL. L. Rv. 321.
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The dual character of our American system of government demands
that the powers reserved to the states be likewise exempt from the
restrictions of federal taxation. 2
"It is admitted that there is no express provision in the
Constitution that prohibits the general government from tax-
ing the means and the instrumentalities of the states, nor is
there any prohibiting the states from taxing the means and
instrumentalities of that government. In both cases the ex-
emption rests upon necessary implication, and is upheld by the
great law of self-preservation; as any government whose
means are employed in conducting its operations, if subject to
the control of another and distinct government, can exist only
at the mercy of that government." 3
The Supreme Court has often attempted to define the exact limi-
tations upon the power of the states to tax a bank chartered by
Congress. 4 In the McCulloch case, Chief Justice Marshall held that
the notes issued by the Bank of the United States were not taxable
by the states. The Court, however, indicated that a state might
validly tax the real property of the bank and the interest of citizens
of the state in the institution, in common with other property of a
similar character located within the state. Privately owned and con-
trolled national banks were first established by act of Congress in
1863. 5 The power of the federal government to regulate and main-
tain the currency was again invoked, as in the McCulloch case, to
justify the establishment of these banks.6 A subsequent series of
decisions held national banks to be subject to state taxation only
when permission was specifically granted by Congress.7  Thus the
states are now permitted to tax the real property of national banks.8
' See Collector v. Day, 78 U. S. 113 (1870) ; Pollock v. Farmers Loan and
Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673 (1894); Ambrosini v. U. S., 187
U. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct. 1 (1902) ; Farmers and Mechanics Savings Bank v. Minne-
sota, 232 U. S. 516, 34 Sup. Ct. 354 (1913).
'Collector v. Day, supra note 2, at 127.
'Van Allen v. The Board of Assessors, 70 U. S. 573 (1865); Waite v.
Dowley, 94 U. S. 527 (1876); Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173
U. S. 664, 19 Sup. Ct. 537 (1898); Louisville Third National Bank v. Stone,
174 U. S. 432, 19 Sup. Ct. 759 (1898) ; junction City First National Bank v.
Moon, 102 Kan. 334, 170 Pac. 33 (1918).
'For an account of the development of national banks, see CONANT,
HISTOiRY OF MODERN BANKS OF ISSUE (1902) pp. 348-385.
'Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U. S. 533 (1869) ; Farmers National Bank v.
Dearing, 91 U. S. 29 (1875); Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, supra
note 4.
Lionberger v. Rouse, 76 U. S. 468 (1869); Old National Bank v. State,
58 W. Va. 559, 52 S. E. 494 (1905) ; Larrabee v. Dolley, 175 Fed. 365 (C. C.
D. Kan. 1909); Dennis v. First National Bank of Great Falls, supra note 1.
'U. S. REv. STAT. 5219 reads in part: "Nothing herein shall be construed
to exempt the real property of associations from either state, county, or munici-
pal taxes to the same extent according to its value as other real property is
taxed."
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In the absence of permissive legislation, attempts by the states to tax
notes, bonds, mortgages, bills or intangible personal property held
for investment have been declared unconstitutional. 9 Nor may a
state tax the franchise of a national bank.10 Shares of stock in a
national bank are permitted to be taxed by the states 11 and thus the
capital of such bank may indirectly be taxed by a levy upon the
stock in the hands of the individual stockholders. 12 The federal gov-
ernment has also granted charters to transcontinental railroads and
franchises to telegraph companies. In every case, the test of a state's
right to tax such institution has been the tendency of the tax to
deprive the corporation of its power to serve the national govern-
ment.13
"It is therefore manifest that exemption of federal agen-
cies from state taxation is dependent, not upon the nature of
the agents or upon the fact that they are agents, but upon the
effect of the tax, that is, upon the question whether the tax
does in truth deprive them of power to serve the government
as they were intended to serve it, or does hinder the efficient
exercise of their power. A tax upon their property has no
such necessary effect. It leaves them free to discharge the
duties they have undertaken to perform. A tax upon their
operations is a direct obstacle to the exercise of federal
powers." 14
In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, the Supreme Court upheld the taxa-
tion by Congress of notes issued by state banks, chiefly upon the
theory that Congress in the maintenance of a sound currency may
'Rosenblatt v. Johnson, 104 U. S. 462 (1881); People v. National Bank,
123 Cal. 53, 55 Pac. 685 (1898).
"Louisville Third National Bank v. Stone, 174 U. S. 432, 19 Sup. Ct. 759
(1898); Louisville v. Citizens National Bank, 174 U. S. 436, 19 Sup. Ct. 874(1898); Citizens National Bank v. Burton, 121 Ky. 876, 90 S. W. 944 (1906).
11 U. S. Rxv. STAT. 5219 reads: "Nothing herein shall prevent the shares of
any association from being included in the valuation of the personal property
of the owner or holder or holder of such shares in assessing taxes imposed by
authority of the state within which the association is located, but the legislature
of each state may determine and direct the manner and place of taxing all the
shares of national banking associrtions located within the state, subject only to
the restriction that the taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed
upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such
state * * *"
" Louisville First National Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U. S. 353 (1869).
"Thomson v. Pacific R. R., 76 U. S. 579 (1869) ; Railroad v. Peniston,
85 U. S. 579 (1873); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts, 125
U. S. 530, 8 Sup. Ct. 961 (1897). See also COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924)
§§604, 605.
", Railroad v. Peniston, supra note 13.
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constitutionally restrain the circulation of notes not issued under its
own authority.15
The power to borrow money is essential to the proper function-
ing of government. Bonds, treasury notes and other obligations of
the United States are therefore exempt from taxation by the states.16
The Court has held that a state tax upon property of an individual is
invalid unless United States bonds owned by him are first deducted
from the assessable amount.17 Conversely, state obligations are not
taxable by the federal government.' 8 And since a municipality is a
subdivision of the state, bonds issued by a city are likewise exempt
from taxation by Congress.19 However, death taxes may be imposed
by either Congress or a state legislature upon the transfer by will or
devise of government securities, even when the transfer is to a state
or to the United States.20  Such taxation is upheld on the theory that
the tax is not really upon the property but only on the privilege of
the testator to transmit by will or descent.
The salaries of officers of the United States are not taxable by
a state 21 and, similarly, the salaries of state officers are exempt from
federal taxation.22 But incomes derived from a mere temporary or
contract relationship with either government are taxable by the
other.23
175 U. S. 533 (1869) at 549. "Having thus in the exercise of undisputed
constitutional powers undertaken to provide a currency for the entire country,
it cannot be questioned that Congress may constitutionally secure the benefit of
it to the people by appropriate legislation. * * * To the same end Congress may
restrain by suitable enactments the circulation as money of any notes not issued
under its own authority."
"Weston v. Charleston, su.ip note 1; U. S. v. Snyder, 149 U. S. 210, 13
Sup. Ct. 846 (1839); North Dakota v. Hanson, 215 U. S. 515, 30 Sup. Ct.
179 (1910).
" In Iowa Loan and Trust Co. v. Fairweather, 252 Fed. 605 (D. C. S. D.
Iowa 1918) at 613, the Court declared: "I cannot but feel that a tax upon the
value of a share of stock, which share has its value wholly or partially because
the corporation which issued the stock has purchased and holds bonds of the
United States specifically exempt from taxation by the state, is contrary to the
letter of the act of Congress and the spirit which underlies such enactment."
"Mercantile National Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138, 7 Sup. Ct. 826
(1886) ; Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct.
673 (1894).
"In Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., supra note 18, at 584, the
Court declared: "The precise question as to the power of Congress to tax
incomes derived from state, county and municipal bonds has never been decided,
but it has often been held that the instrumentalities of the state governments
cannot be directly or indirectly taxed, and, of course, a municipal corporation is
but a branch of the government of the state."
' U. S. v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 16 Sup. Ct. 1073 (1873) (state tax on
bequest to federal government held valid) ; Snyder v. Bettman, 190 U. S. 249,
23 Sup. Ct. 803 (1903) (federal tax on bequest to state held valid). See also
Powell, Extra-territorial Inheritance Taxation (1920) 20 COL. L. Rav. 1.
' Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie, 41 U. S. 435 (1842).
"Collector v. Day, supra note 2.
"Central Pacific R. R. v. California, 162 U. S. 91, 16 Sup. Ct. 766 (1895);
Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup. Ct. 172 (1925).
TAX COMMENT
The case of South Carolina v. United States 24 illustrates the
principle that only strictly governmental activities are exempt from
taxation and that Congress may tax a private enterprise in which a
state has engaged. About 1900, the state of South Carolina enacted
legislation providing for the sale of alcoholic beverages exclusively
by the state. Swayed perhaps by the socialistic features of the
experiment, the Supreme Court declared the venture to be a private
enterprise and held valid a federal tax upon the agents employed by
the state for the purpose.
The public lands of the United States are not taxable by a
state.25 And real property held in trust by the federal government
for the benefit of Indian tribes is similarly exempt from taxation.2 6
It has been held that federal property, which has been sold to a pri-
vate person but the legal title to which has been retained to insure the
performance of certain conditions, is not taxable by a state.2 7 But
the outright sale of public lands to private individuals immediately
renders the land subject to state taxation.28  The sale of an interest
in federal lands, such as rights to mines upon the property, also
renders the possessory estate liable to a state levy.29 The courts have
gone so far as to hold that where the issuance of the patent by the
government is the only act remaining to vest full legal title, the
equitable title of the vendee is fully taxable by the state.30
The question of the taxability of state lands by Congress has
been concerned chiefly with the logical value of the distinction which
the Supreme Court has created between the cases of an outright sale
and a lease. It has been held that the unconditional sale of property
by a state to a private person renders the land immediately taxable.31
However, Gillespie v. Oklalwnta 32 has been regarded as establishing
the rule that the income of an individual derived from lands leased
from a state is not subject to a federal tax. In 1930, the case of
2 199 U. S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct. 110 (1905). See also North Dakota v. Olson,
33 F. (2d) 848 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
2McCoon v. Scale, 76 U. S. 23 (1868) ; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117
U. S. 151, 6 Sup. Ct. 670 (1885) ; Wisconsin Central R. R. Co. v. Price County,
133 U. S. 496, 10 Sup. Ct. 341 (1890).
'McCurdy v. U. S., 264 U. S. 484, 44 Sup. Ct. 345 (1923).
7 Sargeant v. Herrick, 221 U. S. 404, 31 Sup. Ct. 574 (1911) ; People v.
Burke, 204 App. Div. 557, 198 N. Y. Supp. 601 (4th Dept. 1923).
23Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. McShane, 89 U. S. 444 (1874) ; Stryker v.
Goodnow, 123 U. S. 527, 8 Sup. Ct. 203 (1887).
'Elder v. Wood, 208 U. S. 226, 28 Sup. Ct. 263 (1907). In Gillespie v.
Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171 (1921) the Supreme Court declared
the lessee of lands which the United States held in trust for Indian tribes to be
an agent of the government for executing such trust and therefore exempt from
state taxation upon his leasehold interest.
" Bothwell v. Bingham County, 237 U. S. 642, 35 Sup. Ct. 702 (1915);
Irwin v. Wright, 258 U. S. 219, 42 Sup. Ct. 293 (1922).
. Gromer v. Standard Dredging Co., 224 U. S. 362, 32 Sup. Ct. 499 (1912) ;
New Brunswick v. U. S., 276 U. S. 547, 48 Sup. Ct. 371 '(1928).
Gillespie v. Oklahoma, supra note 29.
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Group No. 1 Oil Co. v. Bass 33 was brought on appeal from the
Supreme Court of Texas. Statutes of that state permitted the Texas
legislature to dispose of the public lands, held for the support of the
state university, by sale only. The courts of Texas had so applied
these statutes as to hold that a lease of such university lands consti-
tuted a present sale to the lessees of the gas and the oil in the ground.
Upon appeal, the United States, in upholding a federal tax on a
lessee of such lands, relied upon the ruling of the Texas courts that
the lease created an outright sale, in order to preserve the decision
from an obvious inconsistency with the rule in the Gillespie case. In
its adjudication of the more recent case of Burnet v. Coronado Oil
and Gas Co.,34 a majority of the Supreme Court, in the absence of
any Oklahoma statute similar to that which had determined the deci-
sion in the Bass case, reapplied the rule of Gillespie v. Oklahoma and
held invalid a federal tax upon the lessee of lands owned by the
state of Oklahoma. But a minority of the Court refused to be held by
the doctrine of stare decisis. Justice Stone, dissenting, stated:
"It cannot be said that the identical tax, thus levied, has
any effect on Oklahoma differing from that on Texas. The
fact, if it is a fact, that under the Oklahoma leases the lessees
do not acquire ownership of the oil or gas until they have
severed it from the soil, but before its sale, while the lessees
under the Texas lease acquire it immediately on receipt of their
leases, presents no distinguishing features. All acquire private
right by government grant, from the exploitation of which
they have derived income which upon principles constantly
reiterated by this court, * * * may be taxed as other income
is taxed." 35
To the writer, the minority opinion in the Burnet case seems
clearly the more tenable. First, as admitted in the prevailing opinion,
the effect of the federal tax upon the state's right to control the
public lands is too remote to interfere with such power to any real
extent. Second, the tax is imposed upon the income derived by the
lessee only after the rental price has been allocated to the state, and
therefore the state's sole interest in the property during the leasehold
period is in no way affected by the tax. Finally, the exemption from
taxation of incomes derived from such leases can be productive only
of attempts by private interests to escape the burdens of federal
taxation.
JULIUS LEVENTHAL.
'283 U. S. 279, 51 Sup. Ct. 432 (1931).
' Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 52 Sup. Ct. 443 (1932).
'Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., supra note 34, at 446.
